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Comments

The Federal Bank Fraud Statute: A Plain
Interpretation
Joseph Calliste

After the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v United
States,' the federal government was forced to stop prosecuting
individuals who defrauded federal financial institutions via
check kiting' and other similar schemes.3 To fill this prosecutorial void, Congress passed the Federal Bank Fraud Act 4 ("the
Act") as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. The Act's
purpose is to protect the federal government's interest as an insurer of financial institutions by criminalizing offenses including
check kiting, check forging, the use of stolen checks, credit card
fraud, the diversion of bank funds by bank employees, and making false statements on loan applications.5 Since its passage, the
B.A. 2003, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Chicago.
1 458 US 279 (1982).
2

A check kite is a bank check drawn on insufficient funds at another bank in order

to take advantage of the floating overdraft period. See id at 281-82 (explaining defendant's check kiting scheme). See also Mark J. MacDougall, Judicial Dilution and the
Bank FraudStatute, 111 Banking L J 173, 176 (1994) (discussing Williams' check kiting
scheme).
3 MacDougall, 111 Banking L J at 177 (cited in note 2) (noting that after the Williams decision the Department of Justice stopped prosecuting check kiting).
4 Crime Control Act, Pub L No 98473, 98 Stat 2147 (1984), codified at 18 USC § 1344
(1983).
5 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st
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bank fraud statute has been a popular tool of prosecutors seeking
to punish criminals for various attacks on federally-insured financial institutions.'
The federal government's broad use of the statute, coupled
with ambiguities in its language, has created confusion about the
scope and elements of the criminalized conduct, leaving the circuits split over the precise meaning of the Act. In particular, the
courts disagree about whether the two subsections of the Act
should be read conjunctively or disjunctively, and about whether
specific intent to defraud and victimize a financial institution is
required to sustain a conviction under the statute.7
The bank fraud statute potentially reaches three different
situations: (1) where the defendant's scheme is directed at victimizing the financial institution; (2) where the financial institution is indirectly put at risk of potential or actual loss as the result of the defendant's scheme to defraud someone else; and (3)
where the financial institution is not put at risk of loss, but funds
or other property in custody of the bank are obtained through the
defendant's scheme. The circuits agree that situation (1) is
clearly covered by the statute, but disagree on whether situations (2) and (3) are covered as well.' A plain reading of the broad
language of the statute9 (particularly the second clause) suggests
that all three situations fall within the scope of the Act, but some
courts have limited the scope of the statute to situation (1) on the

Sess 377 (1983). See also Sandra L. Gramman, et al, FinancialInstitutionsFraud,37 Am
Crim L Rev 551, 553-54 (2000).
6 Consider Steven M. Biskupic, Fine Tuning the Bank FraudStatute: A Prosecutor's
Perspective, 82 Marq L Rev 381 (1999) (discussing prosecutors' broad range of uses for
the federal bank fraud statute).
7 Compare United States v McNeil, 320 F3d 1034, 1037-40 (9th Cir 2003) (holding
that the statute should be read disjunctively and requiring only that the bank is in some
way involved in the defendant's overall scheme), with United States v Thomas, 315 F3d
190, 195-201 (3d Cir 2002) (reading the statute conjunctively and requiring specific intent to defraud and victimize the financial institution).
8 Compare Thomas, 315 F3d at 195-201 (requiring specific intent to victimize the
financial institution), with McNeil,320 F3d at 1037-40 (requiring only that the bank is in
some way involved in the defendant's overall scheme and not requiring any proof of an
actual or potential loss) and United States v Everett, 270 F3d 986, 991 (6th Cir 2001)
(requiring that the bank be put at "some risk of loss ... although the perpetrator may
intend to defraud someone other than the bank").
9 The statute punishes perpetrators who "knowingly execut[e], or attemp[t] to execute, a scheme or artifice - (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the
moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody of control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises." 18 USC § 1344 (2000).
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theory that the clearly expressed purpose of the statute requires
this limitation."
In construing the statute, the circuits have looked to the legislative history accompanying the Act for guidance. Those circuits that support a more restrictive interpretation find in this
history evidence that Congress intended the statute to require a
finding of specific intent to victimize the financial institution."
In contrast, those courts that advance a permissive reading draw
support from the judicial construction of the mail and wire fraud
statutes, 2 which served as the model for the bank fraud statute. 3
This Comment addresses the split over the interpretation of
the scope and intent requirements of the Act. Part I reviews recent circuit court decisions, identifying the three principal interpretations of the statute and their implications. It also examines
the abundant legislative record accompanying the passage of the
Act and draws comparisons to the wire and mail fraud statutes.
Part II analyzes the reasoning of the circuit decisions, the legislative history of the Act, the mail and wire fraud statute case
law, and various policy concerns, ultimately concluding that
there is no reason to depart from the plain language of the Act.
Accordingly, the Comment concludes that the statute should be
read disjunctively, without a requirement of specific intent to
victimize the financial institution.
I. THE FEDERAL BANK FRAUD STATUTE IN THE COURTS
A.

The Federal Bank Fraud Statute

As it currently reads, the federal bank fraud statute provides:

10See Thomas, 315 F3d at 196, 197-98 ("[Tlhe legislative history strongly suggest[s]
that... [a] defendant must have deliberately targeted his or her scheme at the banking
institution."); United States v Davis, 989 F2d 244, 246-47 (7th Cir 1993) ("[Tlhe purpose
of [the bank fraud statute] is not to protect people who write checks to con artists but to
protect the federal government's interest as an insurer of financial institutions.").
" See, for example, Thomas, 315 F3d at 196-98 (basing holding that statute requires
specific intent to defraud and victimize financial institution on legislative history).
12 Crime Control Act, 18 USC §§ 1341, 1343 (2000).
13 Compare McNeil, 320 F3d at 1038 (concluding that legislative history of the mail
and wire statute does not support a limiting interpretation), with Thomas, 315 F3d at 198
(reasoning that the legislative history of the mail and wire statute requires a conjunctive
interpretation).
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Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice(1)
to defraud a financial institution; or
(2)
to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property
owned by, or under the custody or control
of, a financial institution, by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.'4
The federal appellate courts agree that the statute creates three
elements of the crime: (a) knowingly; (b) executing or attempting
to execute a scheme or artifice; (c) to defraud, or, through false or
fraudulent representations, obtain the money of, a financial institution.'5 In addition to these elements, the Supreme Court recently clarified that "materiality of falsehood" is an additional
element of both mail and bank fraud under the respective statutes. 6
The courts are split, however, on whether the two subsections of the statute should be read disjunctively or conjunctively. 7 In other words, does the intent requirement of subsection (1) of the statute carry over to subsection (2) of the statute?
Is it necessary that the financial institution was the primary victim of the scheme, or is it only necessary that the funds or property of the bank were involved in some way? These questions all
turn on the issue of whether subsection (2) creates an independent offense under the statute, or whether it merely broadens the
scope of subsection (1).
Whether §§ 1344(1) and (2) Create Two Separate Offenses

B.

The issue of whether to read the bank fraud statute conjunctively or disjunctively seems, at first glance, to be unambiguous.
After all, the language of the statute itself expressly uses the
word "or" to connect subsections (1) and (2). A straightforward
14 18 USC § 1344.

See Thomas, 315 F3d at 195; McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037.
Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 25 (1999).
17 Compare Thomas, 315 F3d at 197-201 (holding that the bank fraud statute should
be read conjunctively), with McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037 (holding that the bank fraud statute
should be read disjunctively).
15

16
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interpretation of the statute would thus allow for prosecution of
schemes specifically directed at a bank or any scheme where the
money, funds, or property of a bank is obtained.
Despite the apparent clarity of the plain language, one circuit has strongly advocated a conjunctive reading of the statute.
In United States v Thomas,x" the Third Circuit, departing from
the other circuit holdings, claimed that the legislative history
and policy concerns mandated a more restrictive reading of the
Act.19 The issue dividing the circuits is whether the Act requires
the defendant to specifically defraud the bank, or whether any
fraud involving the bank suffices.
This issue arises in cases where the defendant does not specifically target the bank as the victim of his fraud but funds are
obtained from the bank as part of the scheme. Such a situation
existed in Thomas, where the defendant, a home healthcare aide
for an elderly woman, induced the woman to sign over checks
worth more than $100,000.2o The victim later accompanied the
defendant to the bank when the defendant cashed the checks,
repeatedly giving her approval for the transactions to bank officials.2 1 Consequently, the bank did not suffer from the scheme,
but it was involved in transferring funds from the victim to the
perpetrator.
For these acts, the defendant was convicted of bank fraud
under § 1344, but the Third Circuit reversed the conviction.2 2 On
appeal, the government argued that subsections (1) and (2) create two independent offenses, with (1) involving specific intent to
defraud a financial institution, and (2) covering any scheme
where the bank is involved in transferring property after false
and fraudulent misrepresentations. 3 The court rejected this argument, reasoning,
[A] disjunctive reading of the two sections, as proposed by
the Government, gives the statute a breadth of scope that
extends well beyond what Congress intended the statute
"s 315 F3d 190 (3d Cir 2002).
19 Id at 197-201 (holding that the legislative history mandates that a defendant have
specific intent to defraud the bank). But see McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037 (holding that the
bank fraud statute should be read disjunctively); United States v Crisci, 273 F3d 235,
239-40 (2d Cir 2001) (reading the bank fraud statute according to the plain language).
20 315 F3d at 194.
21

Id.

22

Id at 206 (reversing the conviction because the defendant did not have specific

intent to defraud the bank).
23

Id at 195.
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to regulate. Subsection (2), unlike (1), provides only the
most tenuous nexus between the scheme or artifice and
the institution of banking, which Congress sought foremost to protect.2 4
In support of this interpretation, the court turned to the congressional history of the statute, noting that "Congress enacted the
statute for the purpose of protecting financial institutions from
the perpetration of fraud upon them, leaving to states the traditional prosecution of crimes of larceny, embezzlement and
fraudulent conversions."2 5 The court concluded that subsection
(2) "does not set forth an independent basis of liability."'
Most of the other circuits have disagreed with the Third Circuit's reading of the statute, and instead have held that the plain
language of the Act mandates a disjunctive reading.2 7 Under a
disjunctive interpretation, subsections (1) and (2) outline two
different ways of committing bank fraud. For example, in United
States v McNeif s the Ninth Circuit recognized that the scope of
the two subsections differs greatly, but concluded that the second
subsection is a catch-all that criminalizes all "schemes to obtain
money or property in the custody or control of a bank by deceptive means."2 9 The Second Circuit similarly rested its holding on
the plain language of the statute, stating that "[b]ecause the two
subsections of Section 1344 are written in the disjunctive," the
section must be interpreted as defining two different ways of
committing bank fraud.3 ° Whether to read the statute conjunctively, as in Thomas,3 or disjunctively, following the other circuits,32 touches on a more fundamental issue: the intent requirement under the Act.

Thomas, 315 F3d at 196.
25 Id.
24

2,

Id at 198.

27

For example, McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037; Cnisci, 273 F3d at 239; United States v

Colton, 231 F3d 890, 897 (4th Cir 2000); United States v Mueller, 74 F3d 1152, 1159
(11th Cir 1996).
28 320 F3d 1034 (9th Cir 2003).
29

Id at 1037.

30 Crisci, 273 F3d at 239. See also Colton, 231 F3d at 897 (accepting a disjunctive

reading of the statute); Mueller, 74 F3d at 1159 (11th Cir 1996) (stating that § 1344 covers two distinct types of bank fraud).
3' 315 F3d at 196.
32 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037; Crisci,273 F3d at 239; Colton, 231 F3d at 897; Mueller,
74 F3d at 1159.
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The Intent Requirement under the Statute

C.

Questions of intent usually arise in situations involving subsection (2), where the defendant has not specifically targeted the
financial institution as his victim. In such situations, the courts
are again split over how to interpret and apply the statute. Three
principal views have emerged: (1) that intent to defraud and victimize the financial institution is required;33 (2) that intent to
defraud, but not necessarily victimize, the financial institution is
required;3 4 and (3) that intent to defraud someone is required,
but not necessarily the financial institution, so long as the financial institution is involved in the transfer of property.35
1. Intent to defraud and victimize the financial institution.
The narrowest view is that the statute requires specific intent to defraud and victimize the financial institution. According
to this view, the subsection (1) requirement of intent to defraud a
financial institution "applies to any indictment pled under the
statute."36 This restrictive position follows naturally from a conjunctive reading of the statute, and is grounded in an analysis of
the legislative history.37
The Third Circuit, which alone advocates a conjunctive interpretation of the statute, noted that Congress "enacted the
bank fraud statute to fill the gaps existing in federal jurisdiction
over 'frauds in which the victims are financial institutions that
are federally created, controlled, or insured.'"38 The court similarly quotes the House Report to show that the statute is primarily concerned with "fraudulent schemes where banks are victims."39 From these statements, the court concluded that the "legislature wanted the intent requirements of subsection (1) to apply to any indictment under the statute, and that, in order to
prove bank fraud, a bank must be more than a mere incidental
player. A defendant must have deliberately targeted his or her
scheme at the banking institution."0 Accordingly, the court con33

See Thomas, 315 F3d at 196.

34 See, for example, McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037.
35 See Everett,270 F3d at 990-91.
36

Thomas, 315 F3d at 196.

37 See id at 197-98 (discussing legislative history).
38

Id at 197, citing S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5).

39 Id, citing Financial Bribery and Fraud Amendments Act of 1984, HR Rep No 98-

901, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1984).
40 Thomas, 315 F3d at 198.
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cluded that "the sine qua non of a bank fraud violation, no matter what subdivision 4of
the statute it is pled under, is the intent
1
to defraud the bank."
The Second Circuit similarly*" held that fraudulent schemes
merely involving a bank are not crimes under the statute unless
there is a specific intent to victimize the bank.43 Under that reading, the statute requires that "the defendant engage in... a pattern or course of conduct designed to deceive a federally chartered or insured financial institution into releasing property,
with the intent to victimize the institution by exposing it to actual or potential loss."44 In a Seventh Circuit case reversing a
bank fraud conviction, Judge Posner also endorsed this position,
noting that the purpose of the statute is "not to protect people
who write checks to con artists but to protect the federal government's interest as an insurer of financial institutions."4 5
In addition to drawing on the congressional record of the
bank fraud statute, courts have looked to the judicial construction of the similarly-structured mail fraud statute 46 for guidance.
For example, in interpreting the mail fraud statute in McNally v
UnitedStates,47 the Supreme Court held that the second subsection serves to broaden the scope of the first clause, not to establish an independent ground of criminal liability.4" The Third Circuit inferred that because the "correct syntactical construction of
the mail fraud statute sheds light on the appropriate construction of the bank fraud statute[,] . . .subsection (2) does not set
forth an independent basis of liability," and specific intent to defraud the bank is required.49

41

Id at 197.

42 In requiring specific intent to defraud a bank, the Second and Seventh Circuits,
like the Third Circuit, essentially argue for a conjunctive reading. The interpretation is
distinguished because the Third Circuit explicitly advocates a conjunctive reading in
opposition to the plain language, whereas the Second and Seventh Circuits attempt to
read a specific intent requirement into each subsection of the Act.
43 See United States v Blackmon, 839 F2d 900, 905-06 (2d Cir 1998); United States v
Rodriguez, 140 F3d 163, 167 (2d Cir 1988).
44 Rodnguez, 140 F3d at 167 (emphasis in original), quoting UnitedStates v Stavroulakis, 952 F2d 686, 694 (2d Cir 1992).
41 Davis, 989 F2d at 247. See also United States v Laljie, 184 F3d 180, 191 (2d Cir
1999) (reversing bank fraud conviction because the bank was merely deceived, not put at
risk of loss).
46 18 USC § 1341.
4' 483 US 350 (1987).
48 Id at 358-59.
49 Thomas, 315 F3d at 198.
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2. Intent to defraud, but not necessarily victimize, the financial institution.
The First and Ninth Circuits have held that although there
must be intent to defraud the financial institution, the federal
bank fraud statute does not require intent to victimize the institution.5 ° In a Ninth Circuit identity theft case, the defendant requested a tax refund in another's name and obtained the funds
by using the other person's personal information to set up a bank
account.5 ' The court upheld the bank fraud conviction, holding
that "bank fraud charges may lie even if the bank is not the immediate or sole victim of the defendant's conduct," so long as the
scheme is directed at deceiving the financial institution.52 The
court in McNeil explicitly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's
use of the congressional record in United States v Dav's 53 to support the opposite contention, arguing that "Congress ...is free to
define federal crimes more broadly than the core harms it seeks
to remedy."54 The court also noted that the most restrictive comments in the congressional55 record concern a different draft of the
statute than was enacted.
The First Circuit similarly held that the intent necessary to
sustain a conviction for bank fraud under the Act is intent to defraud, but not necessarily victimize, the bank.5" The court stated
that "[t]he particular means of deception chosen are not essential
to the intent element, which can therefore be defined as an intent to deceive a bank in order to obtain from it money or other
property. Nothing in the language of § 1344(2) indicates that 'intent to harm' is required."5 7 In concluding that intent to defraud
but not harm was required, the First Circuit cited the mail fraud
statute construction for support, in opposition to the Thomas
court's use of the mail fraud statute. 8
50 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037; United States v Kenrick, 221 F3d 19, 26-29 (1st Cir
2000).
51 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1036.
52 Id at 1037.
63 989 F2d 244 (7th Cir 1993).
54 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1038.
55 Id.
56 Kenrick,221 F3d at 26-29.
57 Id at 27.
58 Compare id at 27-28, citing Neder, 527 US at 21, 23 (discussing a decision in
which the Supreme Court, in interpreting the bank, mail and wire fraud statutes, "followed the 'well-established rule of construction' that 'Congress intends to incorporate the
well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.'"), with Thomas, 315 F3d at 198
(discussing a decision in which the Court held that "Congress intended the second de-
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While most circuits have required proof of intent to defraud
the financial institution, with or without intent to victimize the
institution, they have not agreed on what counts as such proof.
The Second Circuit required a showing of intent to victimize the
institution "by exposing it to actual or potential loss. " 59 The
Tenth Circuit held that the "government does not have to prove
the bank suffered any monetary loss, only that the bank was put
at potential risk."6 ° Many circuits hold that direct financial loss
as a result of the scheme is not required if the bank could face
civil liability for the losses.6 '
3. Intent to defraud someone, but not necessarily the financial institution.
The Sixth Circuit has, seemingly, adopted the most expansive reading of the statute, requiring only intent to defraud
someone where the funds of a financial institution are involved.62
The United States v Everett' court held that the plain meaning
of the statute leads to a disjunctive interpretation, with no specific intent to defraud the bank required.' Thus, the Government
must show only that the defendant, "in the course of committing
fraud on someone[,] causes a federally insured bank to transfer
funds under its possession and control." 5 Such "minimal involvement of the bank" is required under the statute's language
because, 'in such situations, the federally insured bank will
almost always be placed at some risk of loss.6' As in other circuit
court opinions, the Sixth Circuit used the construction of the
mail and wire fraud statutes to support its interpretation.6 7
pendent clause of the mail fraud statute to broaden the scope of the first clause"), citing
McNadly, 483 US at 350.
59 Rodniguez, 140 F3d at 167 (emphasis in original), citing Stavroulakis, 952 F2d at
694. See also Thomas, 315 F3d at 206 (requiring proof of actual or potential loss).
60 United States v Young, 952 F2d 1252, 1257 (10th Cir 1991) (finding that defendant's misrepresentations to the bank put it at risk for civil liability).
61 See, for example, Davis, 989 F2d at 247 ("As a holder in due course of the IRS's
check .. .the bank took free of any defenses the IRS might have had to a suit by the
payee (Williams) or other holders."); UnitedStates vMcCauley, 253 F3d 815, 820 (5th Cir
2001) (holding that all that is required for liability under the bank fraud statute is risk of
civil liability or financial loss).
62 See Everett, 270 F3d at 990-91 ("[Tlhe minimal involvement of the bank... is all
that is required, if the specific intent to defraud someone is present.").
63 270 F3d 986 (6th Cir 2001).
64 Id at 991.
65 Id.
66 Id.

67 Everett,270 F3d at 991 ("This interpretation [that an intent to defraud someone is
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Similarity of the second and third interpretations of the

Act.
In reality, the line between the second and third interpretations of the statute is thin. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where a person defrauds another out of property
through the medium of a financial institution without knowing
that the institution is involved at some level. The distinguishing
characteristic is therefore whether the defendant possessed specific intent to defraud and victimize the bank, or just to defraud
it at someone else's expense. The third view thus collapses into
the second, and the critical question remains whether subsection
(2) of the Act creates an independent offense-whether specific
intent to defraud and victimize is required.
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR PLAIN INTERPRETATION
The statute should be read broadly, with subsections (1) and
(2) creating two different ways of committing bank fraud. The
plain language of the statute clearly uses the disjunctive to link
subsection (1) and (2), thus indicating that each clause was to
create an independent way of committing the offense. Nothing in
the legislative history or the mail fraud statute case law creates
a legitimate reason for contravening the clear meaning of the
text.
A. The Plain Language of the Act Creates a Strong Presumption in Favor of a Disjunctive Reading
Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of
the text. The Supreme Court has stated, "[W]e must, of course,
start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."" In this
case, the statute expressly uses the disjunctive "or" to connect
subsections (1) and (2).69 Thus, § 1344 seems to articulate two
independent ways of committing bank fraud.7 °
all that is necessary] makes the bank fraud statute more harmonious with the mail and
wire fraud statutes, which require only that the mail or wire communication be used to
facilitate the fraud.").
68 R'chards v United States, 369 US 1, 9 (1962).
69 18 USC § 1344.
70 See, for example, McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037 (stating that the first subsection "crimi-

nalizes schemes to defraud financial institutions" while the second subsection "is broader
in that it criminalizes schemes to obtain money or property in the custody or control of a
bank by deceptive means."); Crisci, 273 F3d at 239 (distinguishing first and second sub-
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The plain language is not the end of the matter, however, as
the Supreme Court has also held that courts may look past the
plain language in construing a statute where: (1) the plain language creates inconsistencies within the statute; (2) the plain
language is contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent; or (3)
the application of the plain language would lead to absurd results. 71 While the Court has carved out these three exceptions to
straightforward textual interpretation, it is important to stress
that there is a strong presumption in favor of starting and ending with the plain language. Indeed, the plain language will be
regarded as "conclusive" if one of the exceptions is not clearly
established.7 2
In this case, the plain language does not create inconsistencies within the statute. Read literally, the first subsection punishes schemes directed at defrauding financial institutions, and
the second subsection more expansively punishes schemes involving the transfer of bank property.7 3 There is no logical or
practical contradiction in the plain language. Moreover, application of the plain language would not lead to absurd results. More
schemes will be prosecuted under a disjunctive reading than a
conjunctive reading, and while this may be undesirable for some
parties, it is hardly absurd. Consequently, the first and third exceptions of the Supreme Court's test 74 are clearly not relevant.
Accordingly, analysis of the statute should be focused on
whether the plain reading-the disjunctive reading-is contrary
to a clearly-expressed legislative intent. Because the presumption lies in favor of the plain reading, arguments challenging this
position only have to be rebutted; affirmative arguments, though
they may be persuasive, are not necessary. 5
sections); Colton, 231 F3d at 897 (stating that a conviction under (1) does not require the
"false or fraudulent promises required by [(2)]").
71 United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 580 (1981). See also TransAlaska P'peline
Rate Cases,436 US 631, 643 (1978).
72 Turkette, 452 US at 580.
73 See 18 USC § 1344. The first subsection of the statute makes it a crime "to defraud
a financial institution" while the second subsection states "to obtain any of the moneys,
funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody of
control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises." Id.
74 See Turkette, 452 US at 580; TransAlaska PHpelineRate Cases, 436 US at 643.
75 See, for example, BreadAction Committee v FederalElection Commission,455 US
577, 580-85 (1982) (holding that the plain language controls statutory construction absent "clear evidence" of a "clearly expressed" congressional intent to the contrary and also
holding that challengers to the plain language bear the burden of proving by clear evidence that the legislative history mandates departing from the plain language). See also
Richards, 369 US at 9-10 (finding appellant's argument insufficiently persuasive to over-
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The Legislative History Should Not Trump the Plain Language

The legislative record for the bank fraud statute does not reveal a clearly-expressed purpose contrary to the plain language
of the statute. While the Senate and House Reports both affirm
that the purpose of the Act is to protect federally-insured financial institutions, the record consistently speaks in broad terms of
the scope and powers granted under the Act.7"
1.

Arguments in favor of a conjunctive reading.

The Third and Seventh Circuits7" both used statements from
the congressional record to support a conjunctive interpretation
of the text, in opposition to the plain language. For example, in
Thomas, the Third Circuit argued that although "[t]he use of the
disjunctive 'or' connecting the two subsections seems to indicate
that the two connected subsections of the statute are to be given
independent [effect]," such a reading contradicts the clearlyexpressed legislative intent.78 The Senate committee stated that
the purpose of the statute was to fight "frauds in which the victims are financial institutions that are federally created, controlled, or insured."79 The House similarly noted that the statute
is primarily concerned with "fraudulent schemes where bank[s]
are victims.""° The Third Circuit opined that:
A disjunctive reading of the two sections . . . gives the
statute a breadth of scope that extends well beyond what
Congress intended the statute to regulate. Subsection (2),
unlike (1), provides only the most tenuous nexus between

come plain language of a statute); Turkette, 452 US at 581-87 (analyzing the lower
court's reasoning for departing from the plain language of a statute and finding it inadequate); TransAlaska PipelineRate Cases, 436 US at 643-45 (concluding that petitioners'
arguments for departing from a statute's plain language were inadequate).
76 See S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5) ("[S]erious gaps now exist in the federal jurisdiction over frauds against banks ...and the legislation in this part would assure a basis for federal prosecution of those who victimize these banks through fraudulent schemes."); HR Rep No 98-901 at 2-3 (cited in note 38) (discussing gaps in ability to
prosecute bank fraud).
77 While the Seventh Circuit does not directly refer to the legislative record, use of
such history is inferred in the court's citation of the purpose of the statute. See Davis,989
F2d at 246-47.
78 315 F3d at 196.
79 S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5).
'o HR Rep No 98-901 at 2 (cited in note 39).
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the scheme or artifice and the institution of banking,
which Congress sought foremost to protect.8 '
While the Third Circuit is correct that subsection (2) is more indirectly related to protecting banking than subsection (1), the
relationship between subsection (2) and financial institutions is
sound-subsection (2) clearly speaks of the transfer of funds or
other property from financial institutions. 2
Presumably drawing on the same House and Senate statements,8 3 the Seventh Circuit also advocated a narrow reading of
the text, arguing that the intentions of Congress in passing the
act were limited to protecting the "federal government's interest
as an insurer of financial institutions." 4 Writing for the Court,
Judge Posner stated that a defendant who used a bank to cash a
fraudulently obtained tax refund had not committed bank fraud
under the statute.8 5 Similarly, in requiring a showing of specific
intent to defraud and victimize the financial institution, the Second Circuit agreed with the Third and Seventh Circuits on this
86
point.
The central issue is whether these statements from the congressional record are sufficient to override the plaindisjunctive-language of the statute. The legislative statements
reveal that the disjunctive-conjunctive issue and the intent requirement issue are really one and the same. 7 If the statute is
read disjunctively, then subsection (2) creates an independent
basis of liability, with no requirement of specific intent to victimize the bank. On the other hand, if the statute is read conjunctively, as Thomas recommends,8 8 then the specific intent requirement of subsection (1) can be applied to subsection (2),
mandating proof of intent to defraud and victimize the bank.8 9

81 Thomas, 315 F3d at 196.
82 18 USC § 1344.
83 See note 74.
84 Davis, 989 F2d at 247.
8' Id at 246-47.
86 See Blackmon, 839 F2d at 905-06 (drawing on legislative history); Jodriguez, 140
F3d at 169 (reversing defendant's conviction because the bank was a holder in due course
of the fraudulently obtained checks and therefore faced no liability).
87 See S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5); HR Rep No 98-901 at 2 (cited in note
39).
88 See Thomas, 315 F3d at 199.
89 The Second and Seventh Circuit decisions seem to directly depend on the resolution of this question.
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The legislative history supports a disjunctive reading.

While the House and Senate reports both establish that the
purpose of the bank fraud statute is to deter and criminalize
schemes aimed at harming federally insured banks, they also
speak very generally of the scope and powers granted under the
Act.9" For example, the Senate commented that "serious gaps
now exist in the federal jurisdiction over frauds against banks
... and the legislation in this part would assure a basis for federal prosecution of those who victimize these banks through
fraudulent schemes."9 ' Speaking of the Act as a bridge to cover
gaps in federal power indicates a desire to grant broad and general powers. Restricting the scope of the Act to cover only those
perpetrators possessing specific intent to defraud and victimize
financial institutions, when the second subsection of the statute
clearly does not require such intent, does not harmonize with the
Senate's stated intention to cover holes in federal prosecutors'
ability to fight all manner of financial frauds.
Similarly, the Senate report underscores the broad nature of
the Act by repeatedly using the word "general" to describe the
statute's scope, and by indicating that the Act is meant to curtail
a "wide range of fraudulent activity."9 2 The Senate report also
noted that the bank fraud statute is "modeled on the present
wire and mail fraud statutes," which "have been construed by the
courts to reach a wide range of fraudulent activity."9 3 By speaking approvingly of the broad construction of the mail fraud statute, the Senate report implied that the bank fraud statute should
operate in a similarly broad fashion.
3. A prior draft of the Act does not support a conjunctive
interpretation.
A few courts have sought to support a conjunctive interpretation of the statute through references to the Judiciary Committee's comment on an earlier draft of the Act.94 The text of this
90 See S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5); HR Rep No 98-901 at 2-4 (cited in
note 39).
91 S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5).
92 Id at 377-79.
93 Id at 378.
94 It is unclear where in the legislative history the court in McNei is getting this
earlier draft of the Act, as the cited House report does not speak of this draft. See McNeil,
320 F3d at 1038, citing HR Rep No 98-901 at 11 (cited in note 39). The draft will be assumed to exist, but, as the Ninth Circuit demonstrates, the presence and concerns over of
this earlier version do not provide enough support for overriding the plain language. See
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draft more exactly copied the language of the mail and wire
fraud statutes, making it a crime to "intend to devise a scheme to
defraud a financial institution . . . and engaging in conduct in
furtherance of the scheme."95 Commenting on this version of the
Act, the Judiciary Committee noted:
The new section would prohibit devising a scheme to defraud a financial institution, or to obtain property of such
an institution, and engaging in conduct in furtherance of
such a scheme. The section thus parallels the language of
the current mail fraud and wire fraud statute . . . and is
intended to incorporate case law interpretations of those
sections. The Committee, however, is concerned by the
history of expansive interpretations of that language by
the courts. The current scope of the wire and mail fraud
offenses is clearly greater than that intended by Congress.
Although the Committee endorses the current interpretations of the language, it does not anticipate any further
expansions.9 6
The Ninth Circuit observed that this statement could be used to
advocate limiting the scope of the bank fraud statute, in opposition to the mail and wire fraud statutes.9 7 One could argue that
in rejecting this version of the Act and using alternative language, Congress signaled its desire to avoid creating another expansive criminal statute.
This argument can be rebutted on two grounds. First, the
Ninth Circuit observed that this comment refers to an earlier
version of the Act that was not adopted, and thus these concerns
do not necessarily apply to the current statute. 98 More importantly, the text of the final bank fraud statute demonstrates that
despite the Judiciary Committee's concerns with modeling the
bank fraud statute after the mail and wire fraud statutes,9 9 Congress did just that. The changes in language between the earlier
draft and the final Act do not cut the link between the bank and
mail fraud statutes. 10 0 Instead, the changes emphasize what the
statute is punishing. The earlier draft of the Act made it a crime
subsequent discussion in Part I-B-2.
95 HR Rep No 98-901 at 11 (cited in note 39).
96 Id at 4.
97 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1038.
98 Id at 1038-39.
99 HR Rep No 98-901 at 4 (cited in note 39).
100 Compare id at 11 with 18 USC § 1344.
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to "intend to devise a scheme to defraud a financial institution..
. and to engag[e] in conduct in furtherance of the scheme."1 ' The
final version of the Act instead focuses on the "scheme itself,"
rather than various conduct done in furtherance of the scheme. 102
Whatever the significance of the earlier draft, the change to the
final language does not signify Congress's unequivocal purpose to
limit the scope of the Act to those schemes done with intent to
defraud and victimize a bank.
The final text of the Act still criminalizes any scheme involving a financial institution, and therefore does not plainly require
specific intent to victimize the financial institution. The earlier
draft of the Act, and the Committee's comments about it, do not
contain evidence that the statute should be read conjunctively, in
opposition to the plain language.
4.

Summary.

The legislative history does not contradict the plain language and require a conjunctive reading. The Senate and House
reports both emphasize that the focus of the crime is on the harm
done to the financial institution, not the mental state of the defendant.' ° The Senate report repeatedly mentions that the Act is
meant to protect against crimes committed involving "federally
insured and controlled financial institutions."0 4 The House and
Senate reports neither mention the statute in terms of the
blameworthiness of the defendant's actions, nor clarify the intent
requirement beyond what the text sets forth. 05 This focus on
harm done to federally-supported financial institutions demonstrates that Congress was not concerned with specific intent by
potential defendants; it was concerned with protecting banks
from fraudulent schemes. Consequently, the courts should not
impose a stricter intent requirement than the text demands.
While both the Senate and the House reports do mention
that the purpose of the Act is to protect federally insured finan-

'o1 HR Rep No 98-901 at 11 (cited in note 39). But see note 91.
102 McNeil,320 F3d at 1038-39.
103 S Rep No 98-225 at 377-79 (cited in note 5) ("[T]he legislation in this part would
assure a basis for federal prosecution of those who victimize these banks through fraudulent schemes."); HR Rep No 98-901 at 2-3 (cited in note 39) ("Federal banks and financial
institutions are protected against theft and false statements; this protection, however, is
incomplete.").
104 S Rep No 98-225 at 377-79 (cited in note 5).
105 Id; HR Rep No 98-901 at 2-3 (cited in note 39).
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cial institutions, °6 this purpose is not in opposition with the
plain language of the text. Indeed, if anything, the legislative
history supports a broad construction of the Act, in accordance
with the plain meaning of the text. When utilizing the congressional record for interpretive purposes, there is a strong presumption in favor of construing the statute according to its plain
0 7 The plain language will be abandoned only if it is context."
0 ' The congressional
trary to clearly expressed legislative intent."
0
9
record contains no such evidence.'
As the Ninth Circuit astutely summarized:
Congress, within its constitutional limits, is free to define
federal crimes more broadly than the core harms it seeks
to remedy. In attempting to prevent losses to federally insured institutions-and the damage such losses cause to
the federal fisc-Congress reasonably could have determined that it was appropriate to criminalize schemes to
obtain money or property from a bank whether or not
such schemes expose a bank to actual or potential loss, as
the plain language of the statute suggests."0
The statute should be interpreted disjunctively, allowing for the
prosecution of schemes lacking specific intent to victimize the
financial institution. If the legislature is worried that the broad
language of the statute is being abused by over-aggressive prosecutors, then it has the prerogative to amend the statute to limit
the intent requirement."'
106

S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5) (stating that legislation would allow the

federal government to prosecute people for defrauding federal banks); HR Rep No 98-901
at 2-3 (cited in note 39) (describing gaps in federal ability to prosecute various types of
fraud against banks).
107 See Turkette, 452 US at 580 (stating that the plain language of the statute is generally controlling); Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 US at 643 (stating that the
plain language is usually determinative).
108

Id.

109 See S Rep No 98-225 at 377-79 (cited in note 5); HR Rep No 98-901 at 2-3 (cited in
note 39).
110 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1038.
111 The idea that the judiciary should defer to the clearly expressed words of the legislature, in the absence of a constitutional problem, is widely held. See, for example, Sturges v Crowninshield,17 US 122, 191-208 (1819) (holding that until Congress chooses to
amend federal law to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, state law controls); In re
Thompson, 894 F2d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir 1990) (Baldock concurring in judgment only)
(stating that courts should not "assume a legislative role" based on the demands of equity;
they should instead wait for Congress to amend problematic statutes); United States v
Steele, 896 F2d 998, 1008 (6th Cir 1990), vacd and reheard as 933 F2d 1313 (Ryan dissenting) (asserting that even if "there is an appealing argument that for policy reasons
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The Judicial Construction of the Mail Fraud Statute Supports a Broad Interpretation of the Act

In addition to the congressional record, most circuit courts
evaluating the bank fraud statute have drawn an analogy with
the mail and wire fraud statutes.'1 2 The statutes are similar in
their initial construction and phraseology, and the mail fraud
statute served as the model for the bank fraud statute." 3 The
mail fraud statute reads:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in
any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service,... or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by
the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or
thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both." 4
The language and structure of the bank fraud statute closely
parallels the mail fraud statute: both criminalize those who
devise "scheme[s]" to "obtain money or property."" 5 While the
bank fraud statute targets fraudulent schemes directed at
particular victims (financial institutions), the mail fraud statute focuses on fraudulent schemes utilizing a particular medium of exchange (the mails)." 6
Because of the textual and structural similarities between
the two statutes, courts have routinely looked to case law involvCongress should amend" a federal statute, "this is the responsibility of Congress, not the
courts").
112 See, for example, United States v Monostra, 125 F3d 183, 186-87 (3d Cir 1997)
("Since the bank fraud statute drew important phrasing from the mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes, the history of the latter statutes is relevant to interpreting the act before
us."); Thomas, 315 F3d at 198 ("Because the bank fraud statute was modeled after the
mail fraud statute, the correct syntactical construction of the mail fraud statute sheds
light on the appropriate construction of the bank fraud statute.").
113 Monostra, 125 F3d at 186-87; Thomas, 315 F3d at 198.
114 18 USC § 1341.
115 Compare 18 USC § 1341 with 18 USC § 1344.
116 Id.
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ing the mail fraud statute when constructing the bank fraud
statute. 1 17 Consequently, an analysis of the judicial construction
of the mail fraud statute can provide aid in determining how to
interpret the bank fraud statute.
Courts have uniformly interpreted the mail fraud statute
broadly and expansively. 1 ' Indeed, courts and scholars often express concern at the broad, almost limitless, reach of the statute." 9 The Supreme Court has held that the phrase "any scheme
or artifice to defraud" should be interpreted broadly to include
"everythingdesigned to defraud by representations as to the past
or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future." 2 °
Commenting on this expansive construction, the Seventh Circuit
noted, "The language of the mail-fraud statute is very broad, and
concern has repeatedly been expressed that it not be given too
vague and encompassing a scope by judicial interpretation."2 1
The Second Circuit similarly commented, "[W]e are asked to construe two seemingly limitless provisions, the mail and wire fraud
statutes."'2 2
Despite the courts' consistently broad interpretation of the
mail fraud statute, a few circuits have attempted to find support
for a more limited interpretation of the bank fraud statute in the
mail fraud statute case law. 2 3 For example, the Third Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court held that the second clause of the
mail fraud statute only served to broaden the first clause. 124 The
second clause outlawed any scheme to obtain money by "false or
fraudulent promises," whereas the first clause more narrowly
117 See, for example, Monostra, 125 F3d at 186-87 (discussing McNally, 483 US at 50,
which interpreted the mail and wire fraud statutes); Thomas, 315 F3d at 198 (same).
118 See, for example, Emery v American GeneralFinance,Inc, 71 F3d 1343, 1346 (7th
Cir 1995) ("The language of the mail-fraud statute is very broad."); UnitedStates v Dial,
757 F2d 163, 170 (7th Cir 1985) ("Courts have been more concerned with making sure
that no fraud escapes punishment than with drawing a bright line between fraudulent,
and merely sharp, business practices."); United States v McNeive, 536 F2d 1245, 1252
(8th Cir 1976) ("[O]ur acceptance of the Government's theory in this case would have farreaching ramifications as to the already pervasive mail fraud statute.").
119 See, for example, Emery, 71 F3d at 1343, 1346 (7th Cir 1995) (noting the frequently expressed concern that the mail fraud statute is vulnerable to overbroad interpretation); John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of FiduciaryBreaches and the ProblematicLine Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am
Crim L Rev 117 (1981) (discussing the increasing use of the mail and wire fraud statutes
to impose criminal liability for breach of fiduciary duties).
120 Durlandv UnitedStates, 161 US 306, 312-14 (1896) (emphasis added).
121 Emery, 71 F3d at 1346.
122 United States v Barta, 635 F2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir 1980), overruled in irrelevant
part by McNally, 483 US 350 (1987).
123 See Thomas, 315 F3d at 198; Everett,270 F3d at 991.
124 Thomas, 315 F3d at 198, citing McNally, 483 US at 351.
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criminalized those who devise fraudulent schemes. 2 5 Because of
the similarities between the two statutes, the Third Circuit held
that subsection (2) of the bank fraud statute should be construed
as merely broadening the scope of126subsection (1) and not as setting forth an independent offense.
While the Third Circuit is correct that the second subsection
broadens the scope of subsection (1), this is not all subsection (2)
does. Indeed, the language of subsection (2), following the disjunctive 'or,' indicates that the second clause broadens the reach
of the statute by creating an independentoffense-in addition to
the more narrow offense of subsection (1). The first subsection
deals with schemes specifically defrauding financial institutions,
and the second subsection more expansively covers any scheme
127
involving the transfer of property from financial institutions.
In fact, case law for the mail fraud statute unequivocally
supports a broad interpretation of the bank fraud statute. 12 The
Sixth Circuit recognized this fact when adopting a disjunctive,
plain language view of the statute: "This interpretation makes
the bank fraud statute more harmonious with the mail and wire
fraud statutes, which require only that the mail or wire communication be used to facilitate the fraud."'29 The mail and wire
fraud case law does not provide enough support for rejecting a
plain language interpretation. In fact, an analogy with the mail
and wire fraud statute merely strengthens the disjunctive position-if the mail fraud statute was interpreted broadly, then, by
analogy, the bank fraud statute should also be interpreted
broadly.
Policy Concerns with a Plain Language Interpretation of the
Statute

D.

When interpreting the bank fraud statute, the circuit courts
have appealed for support to various policy arguments in addition to the text, legislative history, and mail fraud statute case
law. None of these arguments presents a compelling reason to
reject the plain language for a conjunctive reading of the Act.
125
126
127
128

18 USC § 1341.
See id at 197-98, citing McNally,483 US at 351.
See 18 USC § 1341.
See, for example, Emery, 71 F3d at 1346 ("The language of the mail-fraud [sic]

statute is very broad."); Dial, 757 F2d at 170 ("Courts have been more concerned with
making sure that no fraud escapes punishment than with drawing a bright line between
fraudulent, and merely sharp, business practices.").
129 Everett,270 F3d at 991.
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Preserving the federal-state criminal law balance.

One concern with reading the bank fraud statute too broadly
is the danger of infringing on state criminal laws. If the statute
is construed according to the plain language, allowing for the
prosecution of any fraudulent scheme involving bank funds (even
when the bank is merely an intermediary between the perpetrator and the victim), then the powers given to federal prosecutors
may conflict with relevant state statutes.13 ° However, the Supreme Court declared that "unless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance. Congress has traditionally been reluctant
to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States." 3 '
The court in Thomas noticed this tension, cautioning that
"Congress enacted the [bank fraud] statute for the purpose of
protecting financial institutions from the perpetration of fraud
on them, leaving to states the traditional prosecution of crimes of
larceny, embezzlement and fraudulent conversions."132 The court
further held that a broad interpretation of the statute "offends
the balance of federal and state jurisdiction and our principles of
comity by imposing federal
law where the federal interest is re" 133
mote and attenuated.

Although Thomas articulates an important concern, its
reasoning is flawed. First, the Supreme Court held that the
federal-state balance is not to be changed by federal law "unless
Congress conveys its purpose clearly. " 134 In this case, Congress
has conveyed its purpose clearly: the Act serves to protect
financial institutions from fraudulent schemes. The broader the
scope of the statute, the more it coheres with Congress's stated
135
purpose of protecting federally insured financial institutions.
Indeed, limiting the government's ability to prosecute under the
Act by imposing the strict specific-intent requirements from
subsection (1) on subsection (2) undermines congressional intent.
While the Supreme Court is sensitive to preserving traditional state criminal jurisdiction, federal criminal laws are al130 See, for example, 720 ILCS 5/16H-15 (2004) ("Misappropriation of financial institution property."); KS ST § 9-2012 (2003) (criminalizing fraud by bank employees).
131 UnitedStates vBass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971).
132 Thomas, 315 F3d at 196.
133 Id at 199.
134 Bass, 404 US at 349 (emphasis added).
135 Compare 18 USC § 1344 with S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 5).
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lowed to encroach on that jurisdiction when there is a clearly
expressed and rational purpose for doing so.13 Congress's desire

to protect federally-supported financial institutions through aggressive prosecution of bank fraud allows for intrusion on general state laws outlawing embezzlement, larceny, and so forth.
This is especially true in light of Congress's willingness to grant
federal prosecutors nearly unchecked power in the form of
RICO,'37 numerous conspiracy laws, 3 ' and the closely-related
mail and wire fraud statutes. 39
Increasing federal power over what were traditionally state
crimes on the basis of the bank fraud statute should not influence a more narrow judicial interpretation in light of the major
expansions of federal power granted under these more extensive
federal statutes. Due to competence concerns, jurisdictional gaps,
and other policy factors, Congress has consistently moved in the
direction of increasing federal prosecutorial power, even at the
expense of state power. Consequently, the courts should construe
the bank fraud statute according to its plain language, even if it
has the effect of decreasing state prosecution of various financial
fraud crimes. Whether or not courts are concerned by these infringements on state power, they should defer to the plain language, especially given the consistent trend towards increased
federal prosecutorial power.
Moreover, any infringement on state criminal jurisdiction
could be tempered in two ways. First, while the bank fraud statute may grant federal prosecutors powers that encroach on state
criminal laws, these prosecutors can exercise their discretion and
not bring cases in federal courts that are better left to the state
courts. The increased power to prosecute under the bank fraud
statute is not a mandate, but a tool federal prosecutors can use
at their discretion. It is likely that workload and limited resources will limit federal prosecution to larger cases, systematically limiting encroachment on state prosecutions to those cases
where the expertise and resources of federal prosecutors are desired. The states likely will still be serving the role of prosecuting
spot fraud and other minor crimes against financial institutions.
Second, even if there clearly is a case where the bank fraud
statute is allowing federal prosecutors to intrude on the states'
136 Bass, 404 US at 349-50.
137 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 USC §§ 19611968 (2000).
138 See, for example, Federal Conspiracy Act, 18 USC § 371 (2000).
139 18 USC § 1341.
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domain, the courts can then analyze whether
the statute's scope
140
basis.
case-by-case
a
on
far
too
has reached
2.

The banks will help deter schemes involving their funds.

Another possible concern with interpreting the statute
broadly is that such an interpretation might discourage efficient
deterrence of financial schemes involving bank property. Many
cases discuss the fact that banks often face civil liability when
money is taken from them through some fraudulent scheme. 14 '
This civil liability is often used as proof that the bank suffered an
actual or potential loss in connection with some fraudulent
plan.44 But, more importantly, civil liability could affect bank
fraud deterrence by affecting financial institutions' own diligence
in watching for fraudulent schemes involving their property.
For example, if the statute is read narrowly, banks might retain an incentive to protect their customers' funds from fraudulent schemes. In many of these cases, banks were involved in
fund transfers between a customer and the defendant. If such
situations did not potentially give rise to a federal bank fraud
prosecution, then banks might fear that more fraudulent
schemes would remain undetected. A greater number of undetected schemes could result in increased civil liability, and thus
banks might step up internal policing of suspicious behavior.
Conversely, if the statute was read to allow for the prosecution of
any scheme involving bank property, then banks might hope that
federal law enforcement would uncover many such thefts, reducing their civil-liability incentive to provide internal policing."
These concerns that reading the statute broadly may create
disincentives for banks and federal law enforcement to uncover
bank frauds should not affect judicial construction of the statute
for three reasons. First, there is no empirical evidence demonstrating: (1) that banks and law enforcement will decrease their
policing of financial institution fraud in the face of a narrower
140

Though, it would be difficult for the courts to articulate and consistently apply a

theory to guide their case by case analysis.
141 See, for example, McNeil, 320 F3d at 1038.
142 See, for example, McCauley, 253 F3d at 820 (holding that the government need
only prove a risk of civil liability to support a conviction of bank fraud); Davis, 989 F2d at
246-47 (stating that because the bank would not face civil liability, it was not put at risk
of loss and thus there was no bank fraud under the statute).
143 The problem may be that internal policing is more effective, because it occurs
closer to the action, and/or that internal policing is less costly for taxpayers. Either way,
it is very difficult to prove either of these propositions true.
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statute, or (2) that there is a direct relationship between the intensity of criminal prosecution under the bank fraud statute and
the degree of civil liability faced by banks from fraudulent
schemes. It is possible that those individuals uncovering bank
frauds (whether private bank employees or law enforcement investigators) are not even aware of the particular interpretation of
the statute in the jurisdiction in which they work. In the absence
of clear evidence that construing the statute broadly will result
in a substantial decrease in financial fraud policing, there is no
reason to depart from the plain language, disjunctive interpretation. Second, even if there were clear evidence proving that
banks and law enforcement would increase policing in the face of
a narrower statute, this evidence should only lead to legislative,
not judicial, amendment of the statute.1 " Finally, it is possible
that financial institutions are the parties that most often discover fraudulent schemes targeting their property. Given the
constant concern of civil liability, banks are not likely to proporjution the intensity of their policing according to the particular
45
dicial interpretation of the federal bank fraud statute.
CONCLUSION

After analyzing the relevant case law, legislative history,
and policy concerns, this Comment advocates a broad reading of
the bank fraud statute, in accordance with the plain language. In
this case, the bank fraud statute uses the disjunctive "or" to connect the two subsections, thus creating two independent clauses,
each outlining a different way of committing bank fraud. This
lack of ambiguity in the plain language creates a strong, though
rebuttable, presumption in favor of reading the statute
broadly.146

14 See In re Thompson, 894 F2d at 1231 (Baldock concurring) (stating that courts
should not "assume a legislative role" based on the demands of equity; they should instead wait for Congress to amend problematic statutes); Sturges, 17 US at 191-208 (holding that until Congress chooses to amend federal law to establish uniform bankruptcy
laws, state law controls); Steele, 896 F2d at 1008 (Ryan dissenting) (asserting that even if
"there is an appealing argument that for policy reasons Congress should amend" a federal
statute, "this is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts").
145 Especially considering the fact that in addition to the federal statute there exist
state statutes, such as 720 ILCS 5/16H-15 ("Misappropriation of financial institution
property") and KS ST § 9-2012 (criminalizing fraud by bank employees), that criminalize
most fraudulent schemes directed at financial institutions in addition to the federal statute.
146

See note 108.
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While several circuit courts appeal to the legislative history
of the Act when concluding that Congress only intended to criminalize schemes in which financial institutions are the direct and
intended victims of the fraud, 47 the legislative record does not
support this conclusion. Congress intended the Act to combat the
flood of financial frauds being directed at federal institutions,
and the legislative history reveals that Congress intended the
scope of the statute to be broad." Consequently, the congressional purpose does not contradict the plain language of the Act.
Furthermore, Congress modeled the bank fraud statute after the
mail and wire fraud statutes, 4 9 and Congress was aware that
these statutes had received a broad judicial construction. 50 Congress remains free to amend the statute in order to curtail its
scope, but until this happens there is no reason to depart from
the plain language. 5 '
Potential policy concerns with a broad interpretation of the
Act do not present a sufficient reason to favor a narrower interpretation. While there does exist a potential conflict between federal and state criminal jurisdictions, Congress has not unlawfully infringed on traditional state criminal law jurisdiction by
seeking to broadly protect federally-insured financial institutions. Finally, any concern over deterring financial institutions
from policing potential frauds is really an empty concern given
the desire of such institutions to escape any and all liabilities for
inappropriate transfers of property. The federal bank fraud statute should therefore be construed to allow for the prosecution of
defendants who lack specific intent to victimize a bank.

147 See Thomas, 315 F3d at 196 (stating that legislative history establishes that bank
fraud statute should only apply when a bank is the intended victim); Blackmon, 839 F2d
at 905-06 (2d Cir 1998) (arguing that legislative history requires bank to be victimized);
Rodiguez, 140 F3d at 167-69 (reversing conviction because defendant did not "engag[e]
in a deceptive course of conduct as to the bank").
148 See S Rep No 98-225 at 379 (cited in note 5) (stating that the statute's purpose is to
"assure the integrity of the Federal banking system").
141 18 USC §§ 1341, 1343.
150 Emery, 71 F3d at 1346 (-The language of the mail-fraud statute is very broad.").
i5i See Sturges, 17 US at 191-208 (holding that until Congress chooses to amend
federal law to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, state law controls).

